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AMERICAN FARMERS have experienced periodic 
financial difficulties for many years. Frequently the 
market-not the actions of individual producers-has 
been the source of these difficulties. As a result, attain-
ing adequate farm prices and incomes and maintaining 
them has become·an important public policy issue. 
The purpose of this paper is to briefly review the need 
for price and income support programs, to characterize 
and evaluate the federal government's response to this 
need, and to outline the issues likely to affect future 
programs. The primary focus will be on "commodity 
programs," although selected broader policy options 
will be briefly analyzed. 
Nature of the Problem 
Understanding economic problems in American agri-
culture is not an easy task. For one thing, observers fre-
quently confuse the symptoms of these problems with 
their causes. The result of such confusion is policies 
which do not alleviate "problems." Another difficulty 
is that economic problems vary over time, by size of 
operation, by enterprise combination, and among 
regions. No single solution will solve all problems. 
Despite these difficulties, government assistance for 
farmers is best understood through two characteristics 
of production agriculture: I) a chronic excess capacity 
for production which results in both low farm incomes 
and low cash returns to capital committed to farming; 
and 2) instability of production, prices, and income. 
Excess Capacity-The average disposable income per 
capita of the farm population has consistently lagged 
behind that earned by the nonfarm population. The 
only exceptions in the past 50 years were in 1973 and 
1979. However, the ratio of farm to nonfarm incomes 
has improved over the years. In the 1930's, the average 
income of farm families averaged less than 40 percent of 
nonfarm families. It rose above 50 percent in the 1950's, 
reaching 70 percent for the first time in 1966, and 80 
percent in 1972. Between 1973 and 1981 the ratio of 
farm to nonfarm incomes varied between 77 and 104 
percent. 
Part of the improvement is the result of farm families 
earning more of their income from off-farm sources. In 
fact, off-farm income grew from 40 percent of total 
farm family income in 1960 to 60 percent in the early 
1980's. 
Farm incomes represent a return on unpaid labor, 
management, and equity in land and equipment. But 
another way to analyze the financial well-being of 
farmers is to consider the return to individual resources. 
Since 1960, for example, current earnings on farm 
equity capital have averaged about 4 percent per year. 
However, when current earnings and capital gains on 
equity capital are combined , the overall rate of return 
on capital more than doubles. These total returns on 
farm equity capital compare favorably to similarly com-
bined returns on common stocks and on government 
and corporate bonds during the 1960-1981 period. 
Instability-Farmers are frequently confronted by in-
stability in production, prices, and income. This in-
stability is caused by a number of factors including 
general economic conditions, weather, political deci-
sions, and plant and animal diseases. Moreover the 
quantity of farm products demanded is only slightly in-
fluenced by prices . This adds to instability problems, as 
does the highly competitive structure of farming, which 
denies individual farmers an opportunity to "balance" 
supply with demand. 
In the recent ten years between 1973 and 1982, aggre-
gate net farm income in the United States varied from 
$18 to 33 billion in current dollar terms. In constant 
dollars, the variation was even more extreme. After 
reaching $25 billion in 1973 (1967 dollars), real income 
declined four straight years to $10 billion in 1977. After 
regaining some lost ground in 1978-79, incomes 
slumped severely to even lower levels in 1980-82. Over-
all, the variability in farm income was over three times 
as great in the 1970's as in 1955-63. 
Unstable income continues to concern particular seg-
ments of agriculture (e.g., crops, livestock) and in-
dividual farmers. A recurring problem is that too many 
resources are coaxed into agricultural production during 
high-price periods. However, these same resources 
-land, labor, and capital-are often so immobile that 
they cannot exit from agriculture when prices turn 
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lower. Thus current returns to resources can be low for 
long periods of time. Table I indicates the variability of 
fa rm income over the past two decades, its recent 
decline associated with excess capacity, and farmers' in-
creasing reliance on off-farm income. 
Table 1-Net Farm Income, 1961-1982. 
Farm operator 
family income 
Net farm operator family from off-farm, 
Year income from farming, per farm per farm 
Current Constant 1967 Constant /967 
dollars dollars dollars 
1961-1965 Avg. $ 3,313 $3 ,604 $3,327 
1966-1970 Avg. 4,369 4, 139 4,796 
1971 -1975 Avg. 9,798 6,357 6,128 
1976-1980 Avg. 9,922 4,935 6,266 
1981 12,349 4,533 6,014 
1982 9,188 3,178 5,683 
Source: United States Department of Agriculture. 
Evolution of Policies and Programs 
Over the years the U.S. government has introduced a 
number of programs designed to directly address the 
problems of low returns to I:esources, price instability, 
and income in agriculture. Commodity programs have 
included such instruments as nonrecourse loans, pro-
duction controls, direct payments to farmers, and 
market orders . Domestic food distribution programs 
have been developed to increase the demand for agricul-
tural products and to provide an adequate and nutri-
tious food supply for low income and dependent 
citizens . Other programs have been created for the inter-
national market to stimulate demand through exports 
and to restrict competitive imports. In the discussion 
that follows, the policies and instruments in each of 
these problem areas are briefly reviewed and evaluated. 
Commodity Programs 
The review that follows is too brief to include a 
thorough discussion of each of the commodities, the 
particular problems encountered by its producers, and 
the government's response to these problems . However, 
several points are worth noting. 
First, the producers of some commodities have re-
ceived relatively little assistance from public funds . Pro-
ducers of cattle, hogs, poultry , and soybeans are not-
able examples . In contrast, producers of such crops as 
wheat, tobacco, peanuts, and cotton have been consis-
tent users of commodity programs. 
Second, the major techniques or instruments used in 
programs have varied according to commodity . These 
techniques can be summarized as follows: 
I) Supply controls and price supports: wheat, corn 
and other feed grains, cotton, rice, peanuts, and to-
bacco. 
2) Price assistance without supply controls: manufac-
tured dairy products and wool. 
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3) Price assistance primarily through limiting im-
ports: sugar and beef. 
4) Price assistance through market ing orders: dairy 
products, certain fruits, and some vegetables. 
The economic and poli tical basis for commodity pro-
grams dates back to the 1920's. That decade, while 
generally favorable for the nonfarm sector, was a period 
of economic crisis for American agriculture. Farm 
prices and incomes plummeted from the levels they had 
reached only a few years previously. The first efforts at 
relief brought forth a series of legislative proposals 
known as McNary-Haugen Bills, none of which were 
adopted. However, that decade did produce the first 
federal program to improve farm prices and incomes in 
the form of the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1929, 
which established the Federal Farm Board and the idea 
of parity . 
Of all the concepts that subsequently became a part of 
commodity programs, the notion of parity or a " fair 
price" was the most lasting. The image of parity became 
associated with higher, more stable, farm incomes. Over 
the last decade, however, policy deliberations about 
farm income have increasingly emphasized costs and 
volume produced . As a result, policymakers have 
moved away from parity. In its place, they have sought 
prices which will at least cover production costs. 
Price supports have been the federal government 's 
primary instrument for stabilizing or raising prices dur-
ing the past half century. Typically, such supports have 
been implemented through nonrecourse loans to 
farmers. These loans may be redeemed either by a cash 
payment or by turning the commodity used as collateral 
over to the government. 
While nonrecourse loans were first set as a percentage 
of parity, they are now set nearer to world market price 
levels. If price supports are set above market prices, 
farmers accept the loans as their prices for particular 
commodities, and the government accumulates stocks . 
The farmer-owned reserve (FOR) is another policy in-
strument used to stabilize commodity prices and at the 
same time to help meet the nation's longer-term domes-
tic and export needs. A product of the Food and 
Agriculture Act of 1977, this measure stipulates that 
feed grains and wheat be held under nonrecourse loans 
for longer periods of time (3-5 years) than under regular 
nonrecourse loans. If prices rise sufficiently while grain 
is in the FOR, farmers can take advantage of those 
higher prices by paying off the loans in cash . The FOR 
both absorbed grains from the market and released 
grains to it until early 1983 . By that time substantial 
stocks had been accumulated, in part because the FOR 
was being used as the primary price support mechanism. 
USDA policymakers then chose to deliberately reduce 
reserve holding through the payment-in-kind (PIK) pro-
gram. 
Supply control programs have been used frequently 
since the 1930's, with the intent of bringing supplies into 
balance with demand at the price support level. In a 
sense, individual producers have had to view these pro-
grams as the price paid for government benefits. How-
ever, production control techniques have varied as has 
their effectiveness. 
The predominant technique used until the early 
1960's was compulsory production control, involving 
acreage allotments and marketing quotas applied to 
each producer on an historical basis. With overproduc-
tion and accumulated stocks plaguing farmers due to 
the ineffectiveness of this approach, the government 
redirected this policy with the emergency Feed Grain 
Act of 1961. A voluntary production control program 
was launched, which provided incentives to persuade 
producers to participate in land diversion programs. 
Following the gradual expansion of this voluntary ap-
proach to most program crops during the 1960's, it was 
refined to provide more operating freedom for farmers 
through more current crop bases and yields and through 
"set-aside" percentages for individual crops, with re-
maining acres to be planted to any crop. 
The increased flexibility in planting coincided with 
the great growth in export demand during 1970's. In 
years like 1973 and 1974 when production increases 
were not as great as demand increases, many policy 
analysts talked openly about ending acreage adjustment 
programs. Indeed, the decade of the 1970's saw little use 
of such programs, although the Agriculture and Con-
sumer Protection Act of 1973 and the Food and Agri-
culture Act of 1977 updated the legislative authority for 
voluntary acreage adjustments. 
The Agriculture and Food Act of 1981 did not change 
the voluntary approach to production control, but it did 
grant more discretionary authority to the Secretary of 
Agriculture than did previous legislation. Because of 
record production in 1981 and 1982 ·and reduced de-
mand, especially in the export sector, the Secretary has 
used that authority. In 1983, the benefits package of ' 
regular and reserve loans, deficiency payments, diver-
sion payments, and payments-in-kind persuaded pro-
ducers to retire a record amount of land from produc-
tion. 
Direct payments for land retirement became an im-
portant policy instrument in the Agricultural Act of 
1956, although such schemes had been used intermit-
tently since 1933. Under the 1956 Act, farmers were 
paid for retiring land and committing it to a Soil Bank. 
In 1973, the Agriculture and Consumer Protection 
Act provided for supplementing market prices with defi-
ciency payments whenever the former fell below pre-
determined target prices. These target prices were linked 
to annual production costs in both the 1973 and 1977 
Acts, but in the 1981 Act they were predetermined for 
the 1982-1985 period. In 1983, the latest version of 
direct payments was the payment-in-kind program. 
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Farmers received a specified amount of grain as pay-
ment for taking land out of production. This grain 
could be converted into dollars on the open market or 
fed to livestock. 
Market segmentation has been proposed since the 
1920's. The idea behind segmentation is to sell in two or 
more markets at different prices. The technique . in-
volved is one of price discrimination in which a com-
modity is sold at a higher pri~e in the primary market 
than in the secondary market. For example, wheat that 
is milled into flour might be sold at a higher price than 
wheat that is exported or fed to livestock. A well-
segmented market will provide higher returns to pro-
ducers than a market in which all of a commodity is sold 
at a single price. However, the problem has always been 
to keep markets divided into high and low price 
segments and to avoid retaliation from other producers 
or trading nations . 
The most notable successes with two-price plans have 
been in the dairy industry and in the sale of fruits and 
vegetables. For milk production, markets are separated 
into fluid milk and processed products, usually using a 
Federal Marketing Order. Fruits and vegetables are seg-
regated between fresh and frozen or canned markets, 
again sometimes using an Order or Federal Marketing 
Agreement. Producer approval through referenda is 
usually required. 
Though there has been no formal use of such a plan 
for grains and cotton, export subsidies during the 1960's 
and early 1970's provided many of the effects of a two-
price plan. The blended export credit plan (the use of in-
terest subsidies) of the 1980's also has some of the trap-
pings of a two-price system. 
Domestic Market Expansion Programs 
Food distribution programs were initiated by the 
Department of Agriculture in 1933. The first program 
supplied surplus food products, including meat, butter, 
cheese, and flour to unemployed workers and their 
families. In August 1935 an amendment to the Agricul-
tural Adjustment Act of 1933, known as Section 32, set 
aside 30 percent of customs receipts to be used to en-
courage the exportation and domestic consumption of 
agricultural commodities. Direct distribution of food to 
schools, institutions, and needy persons continues 
today. 
The school lunch program is another product of the 
1930's which has helped to expand the market for agri-
cultural commodities. The federal govenrment and indi-
vidual states have shared responsibility for the program. 
The food stamp program was initially launched just 
prior to World War II, then revived by Presidential Ex-
ecutive Order in 1961, and finally enacted as the Food 
Stamp Act of 1964. Unlike some previous food distribu-
tion programs, the primary purpose of food stamps has 
been to improve the nutrition of underprivileged per-
sons. 
The food stamp program has become the largest 
assistance program ever instituted in the United States. 
In 1982 more than 20 million people received program 
benefits. However, program cost, now over $11 billion 
annually, appears at least temporarily to have become a 
barrier to further expansion. 
The Child Nutrition Act of 1966 emphasized pro-
viding nutritious meals to children. Special milk, school 
breakfasts, summer food services, and child care food 
programs have all resulted from this law. In addition, 
the women, infants and children (WIC) program pro-
vides nutritious foods to pregnant, postpartum, and 
breastfeeding women who have inadequate incomes . 
The WIC program has grown rapidly, with outlays ris-
ing from $422 million in the 1978 calendar year to an 
estimated $1 billion in 1982. 
In fiscal 1982, food and nutrition assistance programs 
accounted for $15.5 billion of the USDA's budget. 
Food stamps accounted for about 75 percent of the total 
with the remainder scattered across other program 
areas. By comparison, federal outlays on food pro-
grams totaled $789 million in FY 1965 and $6.8 billion 
in FY 1975. 
The economic effects of food and nutrition programs 
and agriculture have been positive, although they can-
not be easily quantified. The federal outlay on food pro-
grams has averaged about 4-5 percent of total consumer 
food expenditures in recent years. One mid-1970's study 
showed that half of that expenditure would not have oc-
curred without government assistance. Another study 
showed that government assistance increased expendi-
tures for high-value food products such as meats, fruits, 
and vegetables. To the extent that food purchases have 
increased as the result of these programs, farm prices 
and incomes have increased. 
Trade Issues and Policies 
In recent years agricultural exports have accounted 
for the production from 30 percent or more of U.S. 
cropland acres. The United States is one of the few 
countries in the world where most trade is the responsi-
- bility of the private sector. Still, general governmental 
policy with respect to such matters as foreign relations, 
national security, GATT negotiatons, currency ex-
change rates, and trade subsidies or restrictions can af-
fect agricultural exports. Several specific governmental 
actions have also increased the demand for agricultural 
products or restricted their importation. 
The Agricultural Trade, Development and Assistance 
Act of 1954, better known as PL-480, is perhaps the 
most significant agricultural trade legislation of the last 
50 years. PL-480 currently provides for selling products 
on the basis of long-term credit and for emergency relief 
through governmental and voluntary relief agencies. In 
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fiscal 1982, the cost of the PL-480 program amounted 
to about $1 billion. 
Perhaps the most important thing about PL-480 is 
not what it costs but what it returns in future commer-
cial trade and improved foreign relations. Over the 
years numerous countries that have received substantial 
PL-480 aid have later become major commercial 
customers of the United States. These countries include 
Taiwan, South Korea, Spain, and Israel. 
The federal government has also promoted exports 
directly. In fiscal 1982 it provided about $36 million for 
this purpose. These funds were used to directly support 
private commodity associations and other groups with a 
strong interest in export promotion . 
Periodically, the United States government has 
sought to expand agricultural exports through various 
export subsidy schemes. For example, in late 1982 a 
blended credit program was initiated. Blended credit 
combines public funds at no interest cost with loan 
guarantees to the private sector. 
No discussion of agricultural exports would be com-
plete without acknowledging that governmental action 
has sometimes reduced exports. During the 1970's, the 
government interrupted the normal flow of agricultural 
exports to protect domestic supplies on at least three 
occasions . In 1980, sales of grain to the Soviet Union 
were halted for foreign policy purposes. In each in-
stance farm commodity exports have been disrupted 
and prices depressed, although it admittedly is impossi-
ble to measure the extent of the loss. As a result of these 
policies, both the 1977 and 1981 Acts included protec-
tive provisions for American farmers in the event future 
embargoes are imposed. 
Finally, U.S. policy has restricted certain agricultural 
imports through quotas and tariffs for many years. The 
legislative authority for limiting imports is a 1935 
amendment to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 
1933, known as Section 22 . Such restrictions now exist 
for dairy products, peanuts, sugar, and beef. While they 
are intended to protect the price of affected commod-
ities, these restrictions can also be seen as inconsistent 
with efforts to expand exports. 
Evaluation of Programs 
Economic and Political Evaluation-Public policies 
for agriculture have undergone continuous evaluation. 
Part of this evaluation has been economic in nature, the 
remainder political. Political evaluation encompasses 
the entire public policy development process, from the 
time individuals initially perceive a problem to the point 
where decisionmakers reach some sort of policy com-
promise. A change in a program or its abandonment 
signals public disapproval, while continuing it signals 
public agreement. The public' s evaluation of price and 
income policy for the agricultural and food sector, 
reaching from the Federal Farm Board of I929 to the 
Agriculture and Food Act of I98I, has resulted in 
signals of both approval and disapproval. However, 
shifts in program emphasis can best be characterized as 
incremental or evolutionary in nature. 
In the I984-85 period, policymakers will be sensitive 
to the recent high costs of commodity programs, the im-
portance of international markets, and the economic 
well-being of farmers and the businesses serving them. 
The new law that emerges in I985 to replace the Agricul-
tural and Food Act of 198I will reflect these concerns as 
well as others that may develop right up until a new act 
is signed into law. 
Assessing Distributional and Other Economic Impacts 
-Evaluating past farm price and income-support pro-
grams is essential for those who must make choices 
about future programs. An overview of the impact of 
commodity, food distribution, and trade programs on 
six separate farm sectors follows . 
(I) Producers-Commodity programs have at least 
marginally increased prices of farm products and in-
comes of producers for short periods of time. However, 
the rapid technical changes in farming, its competitive 
nature, the capitalization of farm earnings into land 
values, the inability to move resources into or out of 
agriculture quickly, and the exposure of farm markets 
to international trade have all combined to deny or 
erode income benefits over longer periods for individual 
farmers. Domestic food distribution and agricultural 
trade policies have also generally supported farm pro-
ducers ' incomes, although some trade interventions 
have disrupted them. 
Economic analyses show that the benefits of price and 
income programs are generally proportional to size 
(market sales) of farms. This means that those farmers 
who produce the most generally receive the most ab-
solute benefits, i.e., benefits proportionate to their size 
in the market, and conversely that farmers with smaller 
sales receive less benefits . Programs tend to protect the 
prices and incomes of farmers as a whole vis-a-vis those 
with whom they buy and sell but not to redistribute 
welfare among farmers. Cash payment limits (currently 
$50,000) and minimum acreage quotas per farm have 
slightly tilted relative benefits away from the largest 
farmers, but these tendencies are probably counteracted 
by other indirect forces associated with size. Moreover, 
the payment limitation did not apply to the recent PIK 
program, in which millions of dollars worth of com-
modities were paid to some large producers. 
Knowledgeable, efficient, economical, aggressive 
operators have more opportunities for expanding their 
scales of operation, their incomes, and their control of 
resources than do operators with the opposite character-
istics . Price and income policies do not substantially 
alter these advantages . If the above characteristics of 
these expanding operators are also coupled with other 
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assets, e.g., inherited capital, their advantages are 
greater and their gains faster. 
The longer run consequences of the stability or secur-
ity which public price and income policies provide for 
the farm structure is unclear. Professionals argue that in 
the presence of economic uncertainty and stress the 
more efficient, knowledgeable, aggressive operators can 
expand faster than other operators . However, they also 
sometimes argue the opposite, that farmers expand their 
operations more quickly in an environment of economic 
prosperity and stability. 
There is little argument, however, that during the past 
three decades there has been a relentless trend toward 
increasing numbers of larger commercial farms . During 
this period, the flow of off-farm income has consistent-
ly grown for all sizes of farms, but particularly for the 
smaller ones. For these farmers, employment opportun-
ities off the farm are more important than price and in-
come policies. Currently, off-farm income comprises 
over 60 percent of total income for the average farm 
family. In 1982, even farmers with gross sales up to 
$IOO,OO earned this much or more of their net incomes 
off the farm . 
(2) International Trade and Interrelationships with 
Domestic Policies-Throughout the history of U.S. 
price and income-support programs, the effect of these 
programs on agricultural trade has been an important 
policy issue. Moreover, this issue has increased in signi-
ficance during the past decade as the proportion of total 
farm production exported grew from I5 percent to 30 
percent. As long as there is no recognized international 
government, trade issues must be dealt with as a part of 
our national policy. 
A wide range of national policies affect international 
trade. At times in the past, price supports have been set 
so high as to inhibit trade with other countries while ex-
port subsidies and "barter aid" have invited retaliation 
from them. However, present policies for most products 
support prices at or only slightly above average world 
levels, use direct payments, and even out market sup-
plies over years. These policies generally support ex-
ports that have long run competitive advantages. Excep-
tions have been embargoes and the continued high sup-
port of dairy products, peanuts, and sugar. Trade is also 
adversely affected by import policies, including duties 
and quotas generally on these same few products and to 
some extent on meats. 
In choosing programs, certain inexorable economic 
consequences of domestic policies to trade should be 
considered . 
(I) Production control programs (e.g., marketing 
quotas) result in less products for export. As a result, 
foreign market opportunities may be forfeited . Like-
wise, if quantities of a product are reduced too much for 
domestic consumers, imports of this product may in-
crease. 
(2) Domestic price supports (e.g., nonrecourse loans) 
at levels significantly above average world prices reduce 
exports and increase imports. 
(3) Price support s set above world prices and lack of 
effective production control must often be followed by 
subsidized exports and restricted imports. 
(4) Direct or deficiency payments for producers in-
crease production and hence export volume and also 
discourage imports unless other trade limits are simul-
taneously put into effect. 
(5) Export subsidization (e.g., blended credit or food 
aid) and import restrictions (e.g., dairy import quotas), 
both adopted to serve domestic policy objectives, in-
crease net agricultural exports. 
(6) Finally, domestic consumer food subsidies (e.g., 
food stamps) affect trade only marginally by reducing 
food available for export or increasing the markets for 
imports. 
Any of these program alternatives may trigger retal-
iatory actions. The lesson is clear. Price and income 
policies in the world today are still domestically deter-
mined within each nation, but rational policymaking for 
a country as agriculturally trade-oriented as the U.S. 
means that major consideration must be given to the in-
terrelationships between domestic policy and trade. 
(3) Agricultural Input and Marketing Industries-The 
economic well-being of farmers has generally been mir-
rored by the agricultural input and marketing sectors. 
When farming has prospered, whether by policies or 
other forces, so have agricultural businesses. A notable 
exception was the dramatic effect of the 1983 PIK pro-
gram. While it generally benefitted farmers, it brought 
losses-even bankruptcies-to many suppliers of farm 
inputs . Like farm firms, agribusinesses have decreased 
in number and increased in size over the years. Com-
modity programs have probably stabilized agribusiness 
incomes in the same way they have stabilized farmers ' 
incomes. 
(4) Rural Communities-The economic welfare of a 
rural community reflects that of both producers and 
supporting agribusinesses. Thus more stability in farm 
product prices and farmer income translates to better 
economic health for the community. Since long-term in-
come gains from programs have been marginal, they 
have provided only minimal gains to communities. 
However, the rural co~munity has also been affected 
by persistent economic changes in the structure and 
operation of farming and its supporting businesses, 
changes largely unrelated to public price and income 
policies. 
(5) Consumers-Consumer welfare is affected by the 
quality of food, it s plentifulness, and the efficiency of 
its production. At times price su pports, production con-
trol, trade, and food di stribution policies have probably 
directly increased food prices. But such programs, along 
with income supplements, have also generally supported 
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an adequate, stable, and generally efficiently-produced 
food supply. 
In the absence of price and income-support pro-
grams, it is likely that consumers would have periodical-
ly experienced lower prices as the "surpluses" cleared 
the market. Or they might have benefitted from more 
efficient production in some sectors as less efficient pro-
ducers were ''driven out.'' At some point, of course, the 
surviving producers might have attempted to gain col-
lective control of the market, which would not have 
been a good omen for consumers. Using such measures 
as real costs, quality, quantity, and proportion of in-
come spent to obtain food and fiber, the effects of these 
policies are uncertain but they are likely to vary among 
commodities. Food distribution and nutrition programs 
have directly benefitted lower-income consumers while 
also aiding producer prices and incomes. 
(6) Treasury Costs-The cost of price and income 
policies has been substantial and growing, albeit erra-
tically (Table 2). 
Table 2-Commodity Credit Corporation Price Sup-
ports and Related Expenditures, Fiscal Years 1961-1983 
(in millions of dollars). 
Major 
Year crops* Dairy Othert Total 
1961-1964 Avg. 1,546 236 437 2,219 
1966-1970 Avg. 2,287 142 389 2,818 
1971-1975 Avg. 1,795 196 398 2,389 
1976-1980 Avg. 2,058 357 932 3,347 
1981 1,370 1,894 736 4,000 
1982 8,989 2,300 309 II ,598 
1983 (Projection) 13,517 2,190 5,393 21,100 
Source: Congressional Budget Office from U.S. Department of 
Agriculture data. 
• Wheat, feedgrains, rice, and upland col/on. 
tfncludes other commodity programs, interest, and administrati ve 
and nonadministrative expenses. 
Even though half of the increase in expenditures dur-
ing the 1970's is due to inflation, the big increases dur-
ing the 1980's are real and dramatic. They are particu-
larly troublesome in light of rising overall budget 
deficits. It is a real political concern that these large 
amounts are spent directly on an economic sector that 
represents only three percent of the population, espe-
cially when the distribution of benefits is keyed to the 
volume produced. The 1981 decision to offer small in-
ducements to crop farmers for meager supply control 
explains the relatively low expenditures that year. The 
subsequent escalation of costs was necessary to handle 
the excessive supplies of two record crop years. The in-
creasing reliance upon direct payments and voluntary 
production controls has shifted the burden of suppor-
ting farmer incomes from consumers to taxpayers. 
The fiscal impacts of domestic food aid policies rose 
dramatically during the late 1960's and throughout the 
1970's, reaching $16 billion a year, but they have now 
been slightly reduced. 
Price and Income Policy Issues in the Future 
Public Policy and Private Policy-Over the past two 
centuries U.S. policies for agriculture and food have 
produced a highly productive system of private enter-
prises operating in a market system within a network of 
public (governmental) working rules, guidelines, and in-
stitutions. Our unique educational and research institu-
tions, family farm agriculture, cooperative credit net-
work, soil conservation agencies, and market informa-
toin and quality control services were set up by public 
policies. More recently, the various price and income 
programs, as well as food programs, emerged with the 
same public sanction. 
Whether public price and income policies will con-
tinue depends upon the citizens' choices in view of 
future economic conditions and problems. 
Probable Future Problem Areas-Price and income 
programs that do emerge are sure to be set up in 
response to perceived public problems. Some of these 
potential problem areas can be identified. 
(1) Instability-After two decades of increasing 
stability in farm production, farm product prices, con-
sumer prices, and agricultural export flows, the 1970's 
ushered in increasing economic instability throughout 
the agricultural and food sector. This instability appears 
to be propelled particularly by U.S. dependence upon 
foreign markets-many dominated by their respective 
governments-but also by unusual weather conditions, 
farmers' reliance upon borrowed capital, unsettled 
money conditions, and floating international exchange 
rates. 
Fluctuations in a market system can contribute useful 
price signals, shift resources to better uses, and 
economically reward efficient management. Yet when 
market variations deteriorate to volatile instability and 
extreme economic uncertainty, they result in severe in-
vestment losses to producers, idle resources, increased 
costs for covering risk, and shortened planning hori-
zons. Farmers rely increasingly on borrowed capital (its 
debt to asset ratio doubled from 1950 to 1982). Further-
more, part of this debt is incurred for nonreal estate 
production purposes. Hence farmers have more dif-
ficulty adjusting to instability by simply reducing their 
living expenses and interruptions of their cash flow 
quickly threaten their equity positions. Beginning 
farmers and commercial operators experience the 
greatest difficulty. If the instability appearing in the 
past decade continues, producers, agribusinesses, and 
consumers are likely to call upon public price and in-
come policy for relief. 
(2) Excess Productivity Capacity- Temporary or 
Chronic-From the 1930's through the decade of the 
1960's, bypassing the War years, an image of excess 
land and labor resources prevailed. Yet in the 1970's, 
this image faded and its fading was reflected in various 
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publications, in rural thinking, and in official govern-
mental pronoucements. During the past two years, this 
image has reemerged with vigor. 
If annual rises in farm output average near 2 percent, 
while domestic population and income growth generate 
I percent or less in added demand, the rapid net trade-
generated demand growth of the first half of the 1970's 
would have to come back to provide a semblance of 
supply-demand balance. Trade-generated demand 
growth dropped to under I percent annually during the 
last half of the 1970's. 
Chronic excess agricultural capacity could be the 
scourge of the future, but capricious weather, natural 
production hazards, and slowly emerging technology 
could also switch the issue to a fear of food shortage. 
World economic and political forces seem able to re-
spond quicker to food deficits than to surpluses; 
similarly, period of surpluses seem to last longer. In 
either case, public price and income policy is likely to be 
relied upon to moderate the economic stress alternative-
ly to producers or consumers. Such policy is probably 
needed because supply and demand balanced sufficient-
ly to avoid dramatic swings in prices seems unlikely to 
emerge as the pattern of the future. 
(3) Expectations of World Food Production-U.S. 
commodity prices and farm incomes are likely to be 
greatly affected by world conditions in the foreseeable 
future. U.S. farm output, compounding at a 1.8 percent 
annual rate in the post World War II period, has con-
sistently exceeded growth in domestic population and 
demand for this output generated by increased incomes. 
However, world population.is likely to continue to grow 
around 2 percent annually for at least a decade and ris-
ing incomes in other countries also increase food de-
mand. 
If developing countries, where 75 percent of the world 
population lives, can consistently increase their food 
production at least as fast as their populations and if in-
come increases generate growth in demands for food (a 
favorable world scenario), the prospects for continued 
growth in demand for U.S. exports of agricultural pro-
ducts will be dim. U.S. agriculture would then be under 
chronic price and income pressure. If, on the other 
hand, growth in food production in developing coun-
tries is less than 2 percent annually, and these countries 
obtain the same purchasing power (an unfavorable 
world scenario), prospects for U.S. exports would be 
brighter and the need for price and income policies 
might be reduced. However, U.S. production, 
marketing, and pricing must remain competitive, 
because other large agricultural exporters-Canada, 
Australia, Brazil, Argentina, EEC, and even emerging 
exporters among developing countries-will also stand 
ready to respond to growing world food needs. 
(4) Future of World Trade Restrictions-Since adop-
tion of the General Agreements on Trade and Tariffs 
(GATT) in 1947, the prohibitive trade barriers of the 
early 1930's have been reduced. Even though some trade 
restrictions have persisted, often of nontariff types and 
on certain agricultural products, world agricultural 
trade has mushroomed twentyfold during the past 
quarter century. As indicated above, world food needs 
imply that there is a strong potential for expanding 
trade even more. But the companion ingredients of 
political stability and the propensities for moderating 
trade conflicts are much less evident. 
Growing frustration with nationalistic trade bar-
riers-and in some cases, deeper political antagon-
isms-could conceivably lead to a serious trade war. 
Such a scenario could hardly benefit American farmers. 
It would result in pressure to provide additional public 
assistance to agriculture. If, on the other hand, trade 
barriers can be reduced, then increased U.S. exports can 
relieve the pressure for new price and income policies . 
Closing Observation-Whatever future price and in-
come policies come forth as responses to these possible 
problem areas, they may simply be traditional, familiar 
packages of instruments slightly retuned. Alternatively, 
program innovations to better ensure stable prices, 
secure incomes, adequate food, reliable trade, and fiscal 
responsibility, might appear. These could involve such 
principles as insurance, targeting programs for par-
ticular regions, declining compensation, self-help, and 
indexing. Finally, price and income policies might be 
designed as "change instruments" on behalf of the 
public. Such policies could be used to conserve land or 
water, disperse population, improve nutrition, 
redistribute income, influence structure and control of 
the family farm, shift enterprises, improve environmen-
tal quality, and bring about desired trade flows. 
Selective alternative farm price and income-support 
policies which exemplify the range of choices follow. 
(1) Gradually phasing out all support policies, pay-
ments, production controls, and trade interventions, let-
ting domestic private market decisions determine pro-
duction, prices, incomes, and trade, with other nations 
pursuing their own national policies. 
(2) Supplementing the choice above only with a par-
tially publicly subsidized national income insurance and 
futures price option program designed to facilitate 
private risk management by farmers. 
(3) Gradually phasing out all price and income 
policies except for a recourse loan program to even out 
farm prices during the marketing year and a minimal 
farmer owned grains reserve recourse loan program to 
provide national food and trade security.' 
(4) Continuing the provisions of the 1981 Act, modi-
fied by setting up a maximum grains reserve as well as a 
minimum grains reserve, indexing price supports to re-
cent multi-year market price averages, indexing target 
prices to recent multi-year costs of production including 
some land costs, extending payment limitations to in-
kind as well as monetary payments, and linking produc-
tion control benefits to soil conservation performances. 
(5) Replacing voluntary production control with com-
pulsory control following farmer referenda supervised 
by a new national marketing board, relying more on 
higher support prices instead of Treasury payments, ag-
gressively negotiating international commodity agree-
ments, and restricting imports to protect domestic 
markets. 
Choices among these and other options will be greatly 
affected by future developments in likely problem areas 
mentioned earlier-economic instability, excess capa-
city, world food production, and world agricultural 
trade. 
When public policies are viewed as instruments, in-
stitutional creations, or responses to society's demands, 
rather than as rigid goals, scientific norms, or em-
bodiments of ideology, one can envision infinite possi-
bilities for their future use . The challenge to those shap-
ing public policy is to keep as many program options 
open as possible and to be certain that the public 
understands both the alternatives available and the pro-
bable consequences of these alternatives. 
Reprinted with permission of the Cooperative Extension Service, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan 
a ~ ... Issued in furtherance of Cooperative Extension work, Acts of May 8 and June 30, 1 914, in cooperation with the /e ;\ U.S. Department of Agriculture. Leo E. Lucas, Director of Cooperative Extension Service, University of Nebraska, : ~ 
Institute of Agriculture and Natural Resources . • ••• ~ •.• ~ 
The Cooperative Extension Service provides information and educational programs to all people without regard to race, color, national origin, sex or handicap. 
